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Introduction
Public debate is heating up over the future development of autonomous
weapon systems.1 Some concerned critics portray that future, often invoking
science-fiction imagery, as a plain choice between a world in which those
systems are banned outright and a world of legal void and ethical collapse
on the battlefield.2 Yet an outright ban on autonomous weapon systems,
even if it could be made effective, trades whatever risks autonomous weapon
systems might pose in war for the real, if less visible, risk of failing to develop
forms of automation that might make the use of force more precise and less
harmful for civilians caught near it. Grounded in a more realistic assessment
of technology—acknowledging what is known and what is yet unknown—as
well as the interests of the many international and domestic actors involved,
this paper outlines a practical alternative: the gradual evolution of codes of
conduct based on traditional legal and ethical principles governing weapons
and warfare.
A November 2012 U.S. Department of Defense policy directive on the topic
defines an “autonomous weapon system” as one “that, once activated, can
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”3
Some such systems already exist, in limited defensive contexts and for which
human operators activate the system and can override its operation, such as
the U.S. Patriot and Phalanx anti-missile systems and Israel’s Iron Dome antimissile system.4 Others are reportedly close at hand, such as a lethal sentry
robot designed in South Korea that might be used against hostile intruders
near its border.5 And many more lie ahead in a future that is less and less
distant.6
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Autonomous weapon systems are entering the battlefields of the future, but they
are doing so one small automated step at a time. The steady march of automation
(in different operational functions on battlefields that themselves vary greatly)
is frankly inevitable, in part because it is not merely a feature of weapons
technology, but of technology generally—anything from self-driving cars to
high frequency trading programs dealing in the financial markets in nanosecond
intervals too swift for human intervention. Automation in weapons technology
is also inevitable as a response to the increasing tempo of military operations
and political pressures to protect not just one’s own personnel but also civilian
persons and property.
Just as increased automation in many fields is inevitable, automation in weapons
will occur, and is occurring, incrementally. Autonomy in weapon systems
might positively promote the aims of the laws of war in some technological
configurations and operational circumstances—but not in others. While
autonomy for weapon systems for its own sake is not a strategic goal of
the U.S. military in weapons design, many factors will push automation in
some circumstances into genuine weapon autonomy. In some operational
circumstances, as both the decision-making power of machines and the tempo
of operations potentially increase, that human role will be likely to slowly
diminish.7 Though automation will be a general feature across battlefield
environments and weapon systems, genuine autonomy in weapons will probably
remain rare for the foreseeable future and driven by special factors such as
reaction speeds and the tempo of particular kinds of operations.
The combination of inevitable and incremental development of automated
systems to the point, in some cases, of genuine weapon autonomy raises not only
complex strategic and operational questions but also profound legal and ethical
ones. Advances in automation toward autonomy raise possibilities of tradeoffs
between substantial gains in the ability to make war less destructive and
harmful, primarily through the benefits of greater automated weapon precision,
on the one hand, and significant dangers that military force will be used more
destructively and with less ethical virtue on the other. Advancing automation
raises cautious hopes among many, but also profound fears among some, about
the future of war.
Highlighting that the incremental automation of some weapon systems in some
forms is inevitable is not a veiled threat in the guise of a prediction. Nor is it
meant to suggest that the path of these technologies is beyond rationally ethical
human control. On the contrary, we believe that sensible regulation of these
systems as they emerge is both possible and desirable. But regulation has to
emerge along with the technologies themselves, and against the backdrop of
a world that will likely come to adopt, over coming decades, technologies
of autonomy for self-driving vehicles, or advanced nursing or elder-care robots,
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or any number of other technologies that evolve from being increasingly
automated to performing some functions with genuine machine autonomy.
With many of these technologies, however, the machine will take actions with
potentially lethal consequences—and it will happen largely because people
conclude over successive decades that machines can sometimes do certain
tasks better than humans can.
Recognizing the incremental evolution of these technologies is key to addressing
the legal and ethical dilemmas associated with their inevitability. This is
particularly so for the United States, because it is a leader both in developing
and deploying new weapon technologies in ways visible to the world, and in
formulating and conducting the legal, policy, and ethical processes of formal
weapons reviews, as required by the laws of armed conflict. The certain
yet gradual development and deployment of these systems, as well as the
humanitarian advantages that may be created by the precision of some systems,
make some proposed responses unworkable as well as normatively dubious,
indeed wrong.8 A sweeping international ban treaty proposed by some advocacy
groups falls into that category.
The United States and its partners have grave interests—legal, moral, and
strategic—in developing, simultaneously with new automated and autonomous
weapons, a broadly shared normative framework and expectations for how these
systems must perform to be lawful. They have an interest in discussions and
exchanges of views and practices with others in the world who are developing
and deploying these weapons. Those interests make it imperative, though, that
the United States and its partners understand that shared norms only come
about with some shared information about each party’s own view of principles,
policies, and practices regarding these weapons. The United States particularly
must therefore resist its own natural impulses toward secrecy and reticence
with respect to military technologies, at least where feasible. U.S. interests
in technological and military secrecy must be balanced here against interests in
shaping the normative terrain—the contours of how international law should be
understood, interpreted, and applied to these new weapons, as well as informal
international expectations about appropriate technological design—on which it
and others will operate militarily as automation evolves.
Just as development of autonomous weapon systems will be incremental, so too
will development of norms about acceptable systems and uses. The United States
and its partners must act, however, before international expectations about
these technologies harden around either of two extreme alternatives: imposing
unrealistic, ineffective or dangerous bans based on sci-fi scenarios of killer
robots rather than realistic understandings of the new technologies and their
uses, or proceeding with few or no constraints at all, which might well result in
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the development, deployment, and sale of “autonomous,” but also patently illegal,
weapons.9
For its part, the United States should assert that existing international law of war
requirements and so-called Article 36 weapons reviews (based on Article 36
of the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions), must be applied by
all parties in the development and deployment of automated weapon systems,
with special scrutiny to systems that are autonomous with respect to target
selection and engagement. At the same time, it should assert equally that these
systems raise novel issues of legal review, and that while the United States has
internal processes and standards seeking to give content to such reviews, it also
understands these as ongoing attempts to develop shared frameworks of best
practices and norms. It should propose and welcome discussion, comment, and
the shared experience of other states, particularly those that are also actively
developing new weapon systems.
National-level processes like these should be combined with international
dialogue aimed at developing common ethical standards and legal
interpretations. Such efforts will help develop a gradually coalescing set
of shared practices and expectations that can be shaped over time as
the technologies emerge and evolve.

Drones: Past Lessons and Future Automation
The incremental march toward automated lethal technologies of the future,
and the legal and ethical challenges that accompany it, can be illustrated
by looking at today’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).10 Unmanned aircraft
piloted from afar are already a significant component of the U.S. arsenal. At this
writing, close to one in three U.S. Air Force aircraft is remotely piloted (though
this number also includes many tiny tactical surveillance drones) and the
unmanned aircraft proportion will only grow.11 Many other states are developing
or importing such technology.12 Current unmanned military aircraft are not
autonomous in the firing of weapons—the weapon must be fired in real-time
by a human controller—and so far there are no known plans or, apparently in
the view of U.S. military planners, reasons today to take the human out of the
weapon firing loop.13
Nor are today’s UAVs truly autonomous as aircraft—they require human pilots
in real-time to fly them, even when they are located far away. They are, however,
increasingly automated in their flight functions—self-landing capabilities,
for example, and particularly automation to the point that a single pilot can
operate several unmanned aircraft at once, increasing efficiency considerably.
The automation of flight is gradually increasing as sensors and aircraft control
through computer programming improves. Looking into the future, some
observers believe that one of the next generations of jet fighter aircraft will
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no longer be manned or, at least, that manned fighter aircraft will be joined by
unmanned aircraft.14 Given that speed in every sense—including turning and
twisting in flight, and reaction and decision times—is an advantage, design will
emphasize automating as many of these functions as possible, in competition
with the enemy’s systems.15
Just as the aircraft might have to be maneuvered far too quickly for detailed
human control of its movements, so too the weapons—against other aircraft,
UAVs, anti-aircraft systems—might have to be utilized at the same speeds in
order to match the beyond-human speed of the aircraft’s own systems (as well as
the enemy aircraft’s similarly automated counter-systems).16 Likewise, as alluded
to above, defense systems on modern U.S. naval vessels have long been able to
target incoming missiles automatically, with humans monitoring the systems’
operation, because human decision-making processes are too slow to deal with
multiple, inbound, high-speed missiles.17 Some military operators regard many
emerging automated weapons as a more sophisticated form of “fire and forget”
self-guided missiles. And because contemporary fighter aircraft are designed
not only for air-to-air combat but for ground attack missions as well, the design
changes that reduce the role of the human controller of the aircraft platform may
shade into automation of the weapons directed at ground targets, too.
Although current remotely-piloted UAVs, on the one hand, and future
autonomous weapons, on the other, are based on different technologies and
operational imperatives, they generate some similar concerns about their
ethical legitimacy and lawfulness. Today’s arguments over the legality of
remotely-piloted, unmanned aircraft in their various missions (especially
regarding targeted killing operations, and concerns that the United States is
using technology to shift risk off its own personnel and onto remote-area civilian
populations) presage the arguments that already loom over weapons systems
that exhibit emerging features of autonomy—arguments, for example, about
supposed limits of targeting precision, erosion of professional military ethics,
and reduced thresholds for employing military force. Those arguments also
offer lessons to guide short- and long-term policy toward autonomous weapons
generally, including systems that are otherwise quite different.

Incremental Automation
These issues are perhaps easiest to imagine in the airpower context. But in other
battlefield contexts as well, the United States and other sophisticated military
powers will find increasingly automated lethal systems ever more attractive. So
too, eventually, will unsophisticated powers and possibly non-state actors, as
such technologies become commodified and offered for licit or illicit sale.
Moreover, as artificial intelligence improves, weapon systems will evolve from
robotic “automation”—the execution of precisely pre-programmed actions
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or sequences in a well-defined and controlled environment—toward genuine
“autonomy,” meaning the robot is capable of generating actions to adapt to
changing and unpredictable environments.18 This evolution will be propelled
by a combination of several factors, including that automated machines may
perform some functions better from a military perspective (in some cases faster,
stealthier, or more precisely) than human equivalents, that they reduce risks to
human soldiers, and that industry will be producing technologies for a range of
applications that can adapted to military functions.
The fact that these technologies of weapon automation will spread over time,
and that they will have good and bad uses, preoccupies many commentators,
some imagining that had the United States not introduced such technologies, no
one else would have either. It is widely believed that the United States will come
to regret having triggered an “arms race” in UAV weapon systems or autonomous
weapons.19 The recent experience of U.S. lethal targeting policy and UAVs informs
the recommendations we offer below. However, the United States has never been
alone in pursuing these capabilities, the technologies of which are a function of
advancing automation in many aspects of life, and it is a dangerous mistake to
believe that it could have kept such capabilities in the box by foregoing them.
Initially, many autonomous weapon systems will be designed for use in
operational environments in which two conditions make their use less legally
or ethically problematic than usually imagined for these systems. First, some
systems will be designed to be used only for “machine-on-machine” encounters,
such as missile defense. This does not mean that there are no issues of targeting
or collateral damage, of course, but in practical terms the concerns are not the
same as, for example, close-in infantry urban warfare. Second, some systems
will be designed only for use in operational environments in which there are few
if any civilians present—an attack against an undersea submarine, for example.
None of these is free from the possibility of target misidentification or selection
errors, or the danger of civilian harm, but certainly not all autonomous weapons
are designed for use in the most difficult environments for machine automation.
It is a mistake, when imagining legal or ethical issues of autonomous weapons,
to start with the most difficult operational environment, for which a lawful fully
autonomous weapon would be the hardest (if even possible) to design.
The naval ship-borne, automated anti-missile systems described above are
usually used in environments with few civilians present. Land-based, automated
anti-missile systems are also machines designed to destroy other machines.
But to take more difficult engineering and regulatory situations, consider
efforts to protect peacekeepers facing the threat of snipers or ambush in an
urban environment, or infantry teams working to secure a town. Small mobile
robots with weapons could act as roving scouts for the human soldiers, with
“intermediate” automation—the robot might be pre-programmed to look for
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certain enemy weapon signatures and to bring the threat to the attention of a
human operator, who then decides whether or not to pull the trigger. Automation
might be used here not only to help keep soldiers safe but because it might help
them distinguish hostile threats from innocent civilians, especially in situations
where the former deliberately hides among the latter.
In the next iteration, the system might be set with the human being not required
to give an affirmative command, but instead merely deciding whether to override
and veto a machine-initiated attack. Perhaps next the system will be designed to
target and fire autonomously but to wait and call for higher-level authorization
only when it assesses possible collateral damage above a certain level. In any of
these permutations that human decision-maker also might not be a soldier on
site, but an off-battlefield, remote robot-controller.
It is already clear that the communications link between human and weapon
system could be jammed or hacked. One technological response might be to
reduce the vulnerability of the communications link by severing it—making the
robot dependent upon executing its own programming, or even rendering it
genuinely autonomous. Moreover, as the speed and complexity of response in
weapon platform maneuvers increases, the communications link might be simply
too slow to control the craft, and greater automation, even autonomy, in at least
some functions might prove an important step.
Covert or special operations will involve their own evolution toward
incrementally autonomous systems (especially as enemy forces use civilians as
cover). Consider the raid on the Osama bin Laden compound—tiny surveillance
robots equipped with facial and voice recognition technology might have helped
to affirmatively identify bin Laden earlier and to distinguish enemy fighters from
innocent bystanders. It might not be a large step to weaponize such systems,
and then perhaps go the next step to allow them to act autonomously—perhaps
initially with a human remote-observer as a failsafe, but with very little time to
override programmed commands.
It is important to note here that no one seriously expects remotely-controlled
or autonomous systems to completely replace humans on the battlefield. Many
military missions will always require humans on the ground, even if in some
contexts they will operate alongside and in conjunction with increasingly
automated, sometimes autonomous, systems.
The examples in the previous paragraphs have all been stylized to sound
precise and cautiously controlled, carefully attentive to the legal requirements
of weapons review. Consider also, however, that at some point in the not-distant
future, someone—maybe in China, maybe in Russia, or someplace else—will
likely design, build, deploy and sell for use in an urban, civilian-filled battlefield
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an autonomous weapon system that is programmed to target only something—
say a person or position—that is firing a weapon and is probably hostile rather
than friendly. Such a weapon system might lack the ability altogether to take
account of civilian presence and likely collateral damage.
Quite apart from the security and war-fighting implications, the U.S. and allied
governments would have grave legal and humanitarian concerns about such a
system offered for sale on the international arms markets, let alone deployed
and used. They would then find themselves potentially facing a weapon system
on the battlefield that conveys significant advantages to its user, but which
they would not deploy themselves because (for reasons described below) they
would not consider it a legal weapon. Such systems are much easier to create
than lawful ones. The speed necessary to respond to such adversary systems in
the field, though, might well create demand for defensive systems that feature
greater autonomy in decision-making.
The implication is that evolution in battlefield robots will be more than simply
a race for ever more sophisticated automated weapon systems. It will also feature
the imperative to counter automated systems that are relatively easy to design
and build, but not actually lawful. Defenses against the latter will come partly
through technical means, but partly, as elaborated in the sections that follow,
through international norms and diplomacy.

Legal and Ethical Requirements of Weapons
Arguments over the legal and ethical legitimacy of particular weapons (or their
legitimate use)—poison as a weapon in war, for example, or the crossbow—
go back very far in the history of warfare. Debates over autonomous robotic
weapons (and also over UAVs) sometimes sound similar to those that arose
with respect to technologies that emerged with the industrial era, such as the
heated arguments of a century ago over submarines and military aviation. A core
objection, then as now, was that they disrupted the prevailing norms of warfare
by radically and illegitimately reducing combat risk to the party using them—an
objection to “remoteness,” joined to a claim (sometimes ethical, sometimes legal,
and sometimes almost aesthetic) that it is unfair, dishonorable, cowardly, or not
sporting to attack from a safe distance, whether with aircraft, submarines, or,
today, a cruise missile, drone, or conceivably an autonomous weapon operating
on its own. The law, to be sure, makes no requirement that sides limit themselves
to the weapons available to the other side; weapons superiority is perfectly
lawful and indeed assumed as part of military necessity.
Emergence of a new weapon often sparks an insistence in some quarters that
the weapon is ethically and legally abhorrent and should be prohibited by law.
Yet historical reality is that if a new weapon system greatly advantages a side,
the tendency is for it gradually to be adopted by others that perceive they
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can benefit from it as well. In some cases, legal prohibitions on the weapon
system as such erode, as happened with military submarines and aircraft; what
survives is a set of legal rules for the use of the new weapon, with greater or
lesser specificity. In other cases, legal prohibitions gain hold. The ban on poison
gas, for example, has survived in one form or another with very considerable
effectiveness over the history of the 20th century. The most recent, and many
would say quite successful, ban on a weapon—the Ottawa Convention banning
antipersonnel landmines—is very much the exception rather than the rule.
Where in this long history of new weapons and attempts to regulate them
ethically and legally will autonomous weapons fit? What are the features of
autonomous robotic weapons that raise ethical and legal concerns? How should
they be addressed, as a matter of law and process—by treaty, for example—or
by some other means? And what difference does the incremental shift from
increasing automation to autonomy mean, if anything, to the legal and ethical
concerns?
One answer to these questions is to wait and see: it is too early to know where
the technology will go, so the debate over ethical and legal principles for robotic
autonomous weapons should be deferred until a system is at hand. Otherwise
it is just an exercise in science fiction. One does not have to embrace a ban on
autonomous systems and their development to say that the wait-and-see view
is shortsighted and faulty, however. Not all of the important innovations in
autonomous weapons are far off on the horizon; some are possible now or will be
in the near-term. Some of these innovations also raise serious questions of law
and ethics even at their current research and development stage.
This is the time—before technologies and weapons development have
become “hardened” in a particular path and before their design architecture is
entrenched and difficult to change—to take account of the law and ethics that
ought to inform and govern autonomous weapons systems, as technology and
innovation let slip the robots of war. This is also the time—before ethical
and legal understandings of autonomous weapon systems become hardened in
the eyes of key constituents of the international system—to propose and defend
a framework for evaluating them that advances simultaneously strategic and
moral interests.
A recent and widely circulated report from the British Ministry of Defense on
the future of unmanned systems made this point forcefully. It noted that as
“technology matures and new capabilities appear, policy-makers will need
to be aware of the potential legal issues and take advice at a very early stage
of any new system’s procurement cycle.”20 This is so whether the system is
intended in the first place to be highly automated but not fully autonomous;
is intended from the beginning to be autonomous in either target selection or
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engagement with a selected target, or both; or turns out upon review to have
unanticipated or unintended autonomous functions (perhaps in how it interoperates with other systems).21
If early and continuing consideration of fundamental normative principles is a
correct ethical and policy approach to the development of autonomous weapon
technologies over time, what are the legal requirements that a weapon system
must meet? There are three substantive rules: two drawn from the law of
weapons, addressing the lawfulness of the weapon as such, and a third from the
law of targeting, addressing the lawful uses of the weapon (and any limitations) in
the conduct of hostilities. These three rules fit under a review process framework
that is also a requirement of law in order to field a new weapon.
Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions provides
the framework for the legal review of new weapons. (The United States, while not
party to Protocol I, very likely accepts the provisions under discussion here as
customary international law binding on all parties.) In the “study, development,
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare,” says
Article 36, a party is “under an obligation to determine whether its employment
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited,” either by Protocol I or by
“any other rule of international law applicable” to such party. The United States,
in its actual practice, has long undertaken extensive legal review of new weapon
systems, for which the provisions of Protocol I are merely the starting point
of a highly detailed legal and administrative review process.22 In the past two
decades, U.S. Defense Department lawyers have rejected proposed new weapons,
including blinding laser weapons in the 1990s, and in recent years, reportedly,
various cutting-edge cyber-technologies for use in cyber-conflict.23
The two substantive rules drawn from weapons law that must be part of any
Article 36 legal review are, first, the rule against inherently indiscriminate
weapons (Article 54(b)(4) of Protocol I) and, second, the rule against weapons
that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury (Article 35(2) of
Protocol I). These two rules describe the lawfulness of the weapon itself. A
weapon is deemed indiscriminate by its very nature if it cannot be aimed at a
specific target and is as likely to hit civilians as combatants.24 Any autonomous
weapon system must comply with this rule; but the mere feature of autonomy
as such does not per se rule compliance. In other words, the fact that an
autonomous weapon system rather than a human being might make the final
targeting decision would not in itself render the system indiscriminate by nature,
so long as it is possible to supply the autonomous system with sufficiently
reliable targeting information to ensure it can be aimed at a lawful target.25 The
second rule on the law of weapons prohibits a weapon as such if its nature is
to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to combatants—weapons
such as warheads filled with glass that could not be detected with X-rays and so,
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for example, would unnecessarily complicate treatment of the wounded. Again,
the fact that an autonomous weapon system selects the target or undertakes the
attack does not violate the rule.26
In sum, although specific circumstances might arise in which an autonomous
weapon system would constitute an indiscriminate weapon by its nature, the fact
of autonomy itself—the fact of machine selection of target and engagement with
it—does not violate the law of armed conflict. Indeed, as the following sections
discuss, it might turn out over time that for some purposes and forms of attack
or defense, autonomous weapons may be able to be more discriminating and
precise than human beings.

A Legal and Ethical Framework for Autonomous Weapon Systems
Even if an autonomous weapon is not illegal on account of its autonomy,
targeting law still governs any particular use of that system. The baseline legal
principles respecting the use of any weapon in hostilities are distinction and
proportionality.
Distinction requires that a combatant, using reasonable judgment in the
circumstances, distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as
military and civilian objects. The most significant effect of this targeting rule
is that although use of autonomous weapon systems is not illegal per se, their
lawful use—the ability to distinguish lawful from unlawful targets—might vary
enormously from one system’s technology to another. Some algorithms, sensors,
or analytic capabilities might perform well; others badly. If one is a lawyer in
a ministry of defense somewhere in the world, whose job is to evaluate the
lawfulness of such weapon systems, including where and under what operational
conditions they can lawfully be used, it will be indispensable to be able to test
each system to know what it can and cannot do and under what circumstances.
The conditions in which the autonomous system will be used—the battlefield
environment and operational settings—will be an important consideration not
just in determining whether the system is lawful generally, but also in identifying
where and under what legal limitations its use would be lawful. An autonomous
system might be deemed inadequate and unlawful in its ability to distinguish
civilians from combatants in operational conditions of infantry urban warfare,
for example, but lawful in battlefield environments with few if any civilians
present.
The proportionality rule requires that even if a weapon meets the test of
distinction, any use of a weapon must also involve evaluation that sets the
anticipated military advantage to be gained against the anticipated civilian harm
(to civilian persons or objects). The harm to civilians must not be excessive
relative to the expected military gain.27 This calculus for taking into account
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civilian collateral damage is difficult for many reasons. While everyone agrees
that civilian harm should not be excessive in relation to military advantages
gained, the comparison is apples and oranges. Although there is a general sense
that such excess can be determined in truly gross cases, there is no accepted
formula that gives determinate outcomes in specific cases. Some military lawyers
proceed largely casuistically, building on what was done in prior situations
and examining similarities and differences. Difficult or not, proportionality is a
fundamental requirement of the law and any completely autonomous weapon
system would have to be able to address proportionality as well as distinction—
though, as with distinction, reasonable judgments of proportionality would be
highly dependent on the operational environment and battlefield in which the
machine was deployed. Again, assessing proportionality is one thing in closein infantry urban warfare, but altogether different in undersea, machine-onmachine war where few if any civilians are present.
These (and others could be added, such as precautions in attack) are daunting
legal and ethical hurdles if the aim is to create a fully autonomous weapon,
capable of matching or surpassing the standards we would expect of a human
soldier performing the same function, in all battlefield circumstances and
operational environments. Important work has been done in the past several
years on whether and how these problems could be resolved as a matter of
machine programming—algorithms, for example, that might capture these two
fundamental principles of distinction and proportionality.28 These research
questions, unsurprisingly, are sharply debated, even as to whether machine
programming could ever fully or adequately reproduce the results of human
judgment in these fundamental law of war matters.29
In order to program distinction, for example, one could theoretically start with
categories and samples of lawful targets—programmed targets could include
persons or weapons that are firing at the robot—and gradually build upwards
toward inductive reasoning about characteristics of lawful targets not already
on the list. Or one could envision systems that integrate sensors and recognition
processes to identify specific, known enemy combatants, perhaps also carrying
weapons. Designers might use case-based reasoning and faster-than-real-time
simulations to improve a machine’s inductive learning. Perhaps these and other
tools for distinguishing lawful from unlawful targets might gradually become
good enough to be reasonable substitutes or even better than humans in the
future—though perhaps not, or only for very limited operational environments
and circumstances. Perhaps they are only appropriate not in a fully autonomous
mode, but as a means of recommending and cuing up proposed targets for the
final judgment of a human operator.
Proportionality, for its part, is a relative judgment that is easy to state as an
abstract rule but very challenging to program in a machine: measure anticipated
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civilian harm and measure military advantage; subtract and measure the balance
against some determined standard of “excessive”; if excessive, do not attack
an otherwise lawful target. From a programming standpoint, this requires
attaching values to various targets, objects, and categories of human beings,
and calculating probabilistic assessments based on many complex contextual
factors. It might also include inductive machine learning from human examples
of judgments about proportionality, seeking to extract practical heuristics from
them. Moreover, a machine’s distinction and proportionality judgments will be
probabilistic (as they are for humans, too), and an important legal, ethical, and
policy question for any such system will be where to set the required confidence
thresholds (again, this is so for humans, too). The appropriate threshold might—
almost certainly will—also vary depending on specific operational context
and mission (for example, permitting a system to fire only when anticipated
collateral damage is close to zero and anticipated military gain is high). Although
engineers and programmers might one day be able to do this well, today they are
a long way off, even in basic conceptualizing, from creating systems sufficiently
sophisticated to perform this function in situations densely populated with
civilians and civilian property.
Yet difficult as these judgments seem to any experienced law-of-war lawyer,
they (and others) are the fundamental conditions that the ethical and lawful
autonomous weapon would have to satisfy and therefore what a programming
development effort must take into account (along with the adequacy of sensor
systems and weaponry). The ethical and legal engineering matter every bit
as much as the mechanical or software engineering do. Legal and ethical
assessments of autonomous systems will not be simply binary—that is, a
system is either acceptable or unacceptable. Some systems might be capable of
sufficient distinction and proportionality to be used only in environments likely
to contain few or no civilians, or only for certain functions likely to pose little
risk of damage to civilian property, or they would be intended for machine-onmachine operations, so that humans would not be an object of attack in any
case. Autonomous weapons, like other sophisticated weapon systems, would
be designed for specific purposes and operational environments.
“Programming the laws of war” at their conceptually most difficult (sophisticated
proportionality, for example) is a vital research project over the long run,
in order to find the greatest gains that can be had from machine decisionmaking within the law. Yet with respect to fielding autonomous weapons in the
nearer term, some of the most difficult challenges to designing the “perfect”
autonomous weapon (able to make judgments of distinction and proportionality
better than expert humans) can be avoided for now. Instead of relying on
complex balancing assessments of probabilistic valuations of advantages and
harms, early generations of autonomous systems deployed by legally and
ethically responsible states will likely be programmed with hard rules: say, that
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the weapon system may not fire (or must seek human operator approval) if it
identifies any human within a specified radius of the target. The science-fiction
problems do need to be addressed, but they do not need to be solved in order to
field “autonomous” weapons that are clearly lawful because they are much more
circumscribed in their operations than the full extent of the law would allow.

Four Major Arguments Against Autonomy in Weapons
If this is the cautiously optimistic vision of autonomous weapon systems, say,
decades or even several generations from now, however, it is subject at the
present time to four major objections. They are arguments against autonomy
in weapon systems at all; for each of them, weapon autonomy as such is the
problem and no mere regulation of autonomous weapons could ever be
satisfactory. As “universal” objections to autonomy in weapons as such,
unsurprisingly each of these figures prominently in calls for a sweeping
preemptive ban on autonomous weapons or, as some advocates have said,
even on the development of technologies or components of automation that
could lead to fully autonomous lethal weapon systems.
The first is a broad claim that machine programming will never reach the point of
satisfying the fundamental ethical and legal principles required to field a lawful
autonomous lethal weapon.30 Artificial intelligence has overpromised before,
and once into the weeds of the judgments that these broad principles imply, the
requisite intuition, cognition, affect, and judgment look ever more marvelously
and uniquely human—especially amid the fog of war.31 This is a core conviction
held by many who favor a complete ban on autonomous lethal weapons. They
generally deny that, even over time and, indeed, no matter how much time or
technological progress takes place, machine systems will ever manage to reach
the point of satisfying the legal or moral requirements of the laws of war. That
is because, they believe, no machine system can, through its programming,
replace the key elements of human emotion and affect that make human beings
irreplaceable in making lethal decisions on the battlefield—compassion,
empathy, and sympathy for other human beings.
These assessments are mostly empirical. Although many who embrace them
might also finally rest upon hidden moral premises denying in principle that a
machine has the moral agency or moral psychology to make lethal decisions
(a separate argument discussed next), they are framed here as distinct factual
claims about the future evolution of technology. The argument rests on
assumptions about how machine technology will actually evolve over decades
or, more frankly, how it will not evolve, as well as beliefs about the special nature
of human beings and their emotional and affective abilities on the battlefield that
no machine could ever exhibit, even over the course of technological evolution.
It is as if to say that no autonomous lethal weapon system could ever pass an
“ethical Turing Test” under which, hypothetically, were a human and a machine
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hidden behind a veil, an objective observer could not tell which was which on
the basis of their behaviors.32
It is of course quite possible that fully autonomous weapons will never achieve
the ability to meet the required standards, even far into the future; it is quite
possible that no autonomous lethal weapon will pass the “ethical Turing Test.”
Yet the radical skepticism that underlies the argument is unjustified. Research
into the possibilities of autonomous machine decision-making, not just in
weapons but across many human activities, is only a couple of decades old. No
basis exists for such sweeping conclusions about the future of technology.
We should not rule out in advance possibilities of positive technological
outcomes—including the development of technologies of war that might reduce
risks to civilians by making targeting more precise and firing decisions more
controlled (especially compared to human-soldier failings that are so often
exacerbated by fear, panic, vengeance, or other emotions—not to mention the
limits of human senses and cognition). It may well be, for instance, that weapons
systems with greater and greater levels of automation can—in some battlefield
contexts, and perhaps more and more over time—reduce misidentification of
military targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, or allow
for using smaller quanta of force compared to human decision-making. True,
relying on the promise of computer analytics and artificial intelligence risks
pushing us down a slippery slope, propelled by the future promise of technology
to overcome human failings rather than addressing the weaknesses of human
moral psychology directly.
But the protection of civilians in war and reduction of the harms of war are
not finally about the promotion of human virtue and the suppression of vice
as ends in themselves; human moral psychology is a means to those ends. If
technology can further those goals more reliably and lessen dependence upon
human beings with their virtues but also their moral frailties—by increasing
precision, taking humans off the battlefield and reducing the pressures of
human soldiers’ interests in self-preservation, and substituting a more easily
disposable machine—this is to the good. Articulation of the tests of lawfulness
that any autonomous lethal weapon system must ultimately meet helps channel
technological development toward those protective ends of the law of armed
conflict.
The second major argument against development of autonomous weapon systems
is a moral one: it is simply wrong per se to take the human moral agent entirely
out of the firing loop. A machine, no matter how good, cannot completely replace
the presence of a true moral agent in the form of a human being possessed of a
conscience and the faculty of moral judgment (even if flawed in human ways).33
Perhaps we should make a societal choice, independent of consequences, and
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independent of how well machines might someday perform these tasks, to
declare that the application of lethal violence should in no circumstances ever
be delegated entirely to a machine.
This is a difficult argument to address, since it stops with a moral principle that
one either accepts or does not accept. Whatever merit it has today, one must
consider that in the foreseeable future we will be turning over more and more
functions with life or death implications to machines—such as driverless cars
or automatic robot surgery technologies—not simply because they are more
convenient but because they prove to be safer, and our basic notions about
machine and human decision-making will evolve. A world that comes, if it does,
to accept self-driving autonomous cars is likely to be one in which people expect
those technologies to be applied to weapons and the battlefield, precisely
because it regards them as better (and indeed might find morally objectionable
the failure to use them). Moreover, this objection raises a further question as
to what constitutes the tipping point into impermissible autonomy given that
the automation of weapons’ functions is likely to occur in incremental steps—
there are many steps along the way to full autonomy at which the machine’s
contribution to a lethal decision would far exceed a human’s.
The fundamental moral lesson that the current ban campaign seems to have
drawn from the earlier campaign to ban landmines is that a weapon that is
not aimed by a human being at the point of firing is inherently wrong—for the
reason of not having a human fire it. The alternative and, in our view, correct
deontological principle is that any weapon that undertakes target selection
and firing at targets, irrespective of mechanism or agency, must be capable of
meeting the fundamental requirements of the laws of war. We do not accept
that a machine-made lethal decision is always and necessarily mala in se;
and if that is ever accepted as a general moral principle, it promises to raise
difficulties for machine systems far beyond weapons.34 Machine-versus-human
for these weapons-related activities might someday turn out to be morally
incidental—a contingent, rather than morally inherent, feature of a weapon and
its use. What matters morally is the ability consistently to behave in a certain
way and to a specified level of performance. The “package” it comes in, machine
or human, is not the deepest moral principle.
A third major argument holds that autonomous weapon systems that remove the
human being from the firing loop are unacceptable because they undermine
the possibility of holding anyone accountable for what, if done by a human soldier,
might be a war crime.35 If the decision to fire is taken by a machine, who should
be held responsible—criminally or otherwise—for mistakes? The soldier who
allowed the weapon system to be used where it made a bad decision?36 The
commander who chose to employ it on the battlefield? The engineer or designer
who programmed it in the first place?37
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This is an objection particularly salient to those who put significant faith in law
of armed conflict accountability through mechanisms of individual criminal
liability, especially international tribunals or other judicial mechanisms. In some
instances, to be sure, there will still be human decision-makers who can be held
individually accountable for grossly improper design or deployment decisions.
Indeed, those involved in programming autonomous weapons systems or their
settings for particular circumstances will confront directly very difficult value
judgments that may even be subjected to new forms of close scrutiny because
they are documented in computer code rather than individual minds. The
recent Defense Department policy directive is innovative in its insistence upon
training human soldiers in the proper operation of systems, including choosing
whether an automated or autonomous system is appropriate to particular
battlefield conditions. These provisions in the directive point to practical ways to
strengthen human accountability as automated systems are brought online.
Narrow focus on post-hoc judicial accountability for individuals in war is a
mistake in any case. It is just one of many mechanisms for promoting and
enforcing compliance with the laws of war. Excessive devotion to individual
criminal liability as the presumptive mechanism of accountability risks
blocking development of machine systems that might, if successful, reduce
actual harms to soldiers as well as to civilians on or near the battlefield.
Effective adherence to the law of armed conflict traditionally has been through
mechanisms of state (or armed party) responsibility. Responsibility on the front
end, by a party to a conflict, is reflected in how a party plans its operations,
through its rules of engagement and the “operational law of war.” Although
administrative and judicial mechanisms aimed at individuals play some
important enforcement role, the law of armed conflict has its greatest effect and
offers the greatest protections in war when it applies to a side as a whole.
It would be unfortunate to sacrifice real-world gains consisting of reduced
battlefield harm through machine systems (assuming there are any such gains)
simply in order to satisfy an a priori principle that there always be a human
to hold accountable. It would be better to adapt mechanisms of collective
responsibility borne by a “side” in war, through its operational planning and
law, including legal reviews of weapon systems and justification of their use
in particular operational conditions.
Finally, the long-run development of autonomous weapon systems faces an
objection that by removing human soldiers from risk and reducing harm to civilians
through greater precision, the disincentive to resort to armed force is diminished.38
The two features of precision and remoteness (especially in combination) that
make war less damaging in its effects are the same two features that make it
easier to undertake. Automation, and finally autonomy, might well carry these
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features to whole new levels. The result might be a greater propensity to wage
war or to resort to military force.39
This argument is invoked frequently, though it is morally and practically
misconceived. To start with, to the extent it entails deliberately foregoing
available protections for civilians or soldiers in war, for fear that political leaders
would resort to war more than they ought, morally amounts to holding those
endangered humans as hostages, mere means to pressure political leaders.
Furthermore, this concern is not special to autonomous weapons. The same
objection has already been made with respect to remotely-piloted UAVs and
high-altitude bombing before that. Generally, it can be made with respect to
any technological development that either reduces risk to one’s own forces or
reduces risk to civilians, or both.40 Yet it is not generally accepted as a moral
proposition in other contexts of war—indeed, quite the other way around. All
things equal, as a moral matter (even where the law does not require it), sides
should strive to use the most sparing methods and means of war; there is no
good reason why this obvious moral notion should suddenly be turned on
its head.
The argument rests on further questionable assumptions, not just about
morality and using people as mere means, but about the “optimal” level of force
and whether it is even a meaningful idea in a struggle between two sides with
incompatible aims. Force might conceivably be used “too” often, but sometimes
it is necessary to combat aggression, atrocities, or threats of the same.
Technologies that reduce risks to human soldiers (or civilians) may also facilitate
desirable—even morally imperative—military action. More broadly, trying to
reduce warfare and the resort to force by seeking to control the availability of
certain weapon systems—particularly those that might make war less risky or
less damaging in its conduct—is the tail wagging the dog: how much war occurs
and at what intensity and level of destructiveness depends on a slew of much
more significant factors, ranging across law, politics, diplomacy, the effectiveness
of international institutions, the nature of threats, and many other things.

International Treaties and the Challenge of Incremental Evolution
These four objections run to the whole enterprise of building autonomous
weapon systems, and important debates could be held around each of them.
Each has serious weaknesses, but whatever their merits in theory, they all face
a practical difficulty in the incremental way autonomous weapon systems will
develop out of gradually increasing automation of multiple and often discrete
subsystems in a weapon system. The four grand objections are often voiced,
after all, as though there was likely to be some determinable break-point between
the fully human-controlled system and the fully machine-controlled one. It is
unlikely to happen that way. Even if, in principle, a “fully autonomous weapon
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system” is one in which the weapon system selects the target and engages it,
with no human being “in” or even “on the loop” (to effect a human override), in
practical terms, it is far more likely that the evolution of weapons technology will
be gradual, slowly and indistinctly eroding the role of the human in both target
identification and firing at the target. It will not be so clear when automation of
the system has advanced so far that, for the purposes of the objections voiced by
critics, the machine operates according to its own programming.
“Incrementality”—moving gradually from automation to genuine autonomy—
does not by itself render any of the four universal objections wrong per se. But
it does mean that another kind of discussion should be had about regulation of
weapons systems undergoing step-by-step change. It is much less conceptual
and intellectual than the four arguments above—but more consequential. A fully
autonomous weapon system is easy to define in the abstract: in the Department
of Defense directive’s terminology, it is a weapon system in which the machine
both selects the target and engages it without human intervention. But applying
this definition will probably encounter trouble in many particular cases, mostly
in determining whether the human operator has a sufficiently robust role to
say that the system is not autonomous. Such assessment addresses only
the question of whether the system exhibits full autonomy, in any event, not the
further question of whether its automated capabilities are legally sufficient for
its operational battlefield environment.
Instead, what engineers and designers do on a daily basis in developing these
systems gives rise to the regulatory conversation that most matters. What
matters in practical terms is the granular discussion of specific and particular
programming, incremental changes to any and all subsystems—interwoven
at each step of design and development with the normative requirements of
weapons law.
As mentioned earlier, the United States is sometimes portrayed as engaged in
heedless pursuit of technological advantage that will inevitably be fleeting as
other countries mimic, steal, or reverse-engineer its technologies.41 According
to this view, if the United States would quit pursuing these technologies, the
genie might remain in the bottle or at least emerge much more slowly. This is
exaggerated or wrong, though, in part because the automation technologies
at issue are being developed in other states as well and are already spreading
with respect to general use far outside of military applications.42
It is also true, in the area of weapons development, that it is easier, faster, and
cheaper for states competitively engaged with the United States to deploy
systems that would be, in the U.S. view or those of its partners and close allies,
ethically and legally deficient. Autonomous and unlawful is easy; autonomous
and lawful, for the most difficult operational environments, is hard.
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For this reason among many others, the United States and its partners do have
strong interests in seeing that development and deployment of both highly
automated and autonomous battlefield robots be reviewed and regulated in some
fashion to ensure that those developed and deployed are lawful. Moreover, it
is quite true (as some critics of U.S. weapons-development policy have pointed
out) that, even if U.S. abstention from developing weapons based in these
new technologies of automation and autonomy alone would not prevent their
proliferation, it would be reckless nonetheless for the United States along with its
partners to pursue them without a well-conceived and shared policy strategy—
including a role for normative constraints—for responding to other states’ or
actors’ design, development, deployment, and use of them.
These considerations—and alarm at the apparent development of an arms
race around these emerging and future weapons—have led many to believe
that an important part of the solution lies in some form of multilateral treaty.43
Some have proposed that a treaty might be a regulatory one, restricting
acceptable weapons systems or restricting acceptable use, following the
pattern of regulatory weapon treaties of the past—the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration (banning some munitions below 400 grams weight as causing
unnecessary suffering), for example. An international regulatory protocol might
provide guidance as to the level of automation presumptively permissible—
or impermissible—for certain categories of operations, such as machineon-machine in naval warfare (with few if any civilians present), for example.
Regulatory treaties for weapons face difficult conceptual drafting questions such
as whether there are sufficiently specified technological design and operational
conditions (but also reasonably stable as technologies change over time) that
a protocol can offer legal guidance that will not be quickly outdated and made
obsolete. Those who believe that an international regulatory agreement is
immediately the best approach have to consider carefully whether and to what
extent a new weapons protocol and its process of diplomatic negotiation, in
this new and rapidly shifting technological area, can or should take the lead
in seeking to formulate new binding law. Too quick a rush to a binding protocol
risks instability of norms and rapid obsolescence through technological change,
or vacuity through the inability to formulate the kinds of specific and yet not
quickly outdated provisions worth enshrining in a binding treaty. It would be
more prudent, in seeking a stable basis for law over the long run, to let other,
less formal processes take the lead to allow genuinely widely shared norms to
coalesce in a very difficult area.
Be that as it may, the limelight of public and media attention has been taken
today, not by any regulatory treaty proposal, but instead by calls for a prohibitory
treaty. The model of this kind of prohibitory weapons treaty is the 1997 Ottawa
Convention banning antipersonnel landmines.44 A coalition of advocacy groups
called the International Committee for Robot Arms Control has been working
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over the last few years to promote an international convention to prohibit
“[f]urther development, acquisition, deployment, and use of armed autonomous
robot weapons.”45 The call for a prohibitory international ban was raised
to far greater prominence recently when, in November 2012, Human Rights
Watch issued a report calling for a sweeping multilateral treaty that would
ban outright the development, production, sale, deployment, or use of “fully
autonomous weapons” programmed to select and engage targets without human
intervention.46 The report, “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots,”
was controversial in several of its key assertions. It did not limit itself, for
example, to saying that a ban treaty was necessary to create new law outlawing
a category of new weapons; it said, rather, that its “initial evaluation” of fully
autonomous weapons showed that they “would appear to be incapable of abiding
by key principles of international humanitarian law,” thus suggesting illegality
under existing law.47 Moreover, it did not limit itself to calling for a ban on fully
autonomous weapons. It went much further to call for a ban on “development”
of any fully autonomous weapon system.
In any case, ambitions for a multilateral treaty regulating or prohibiting
autonomous weapon systems are misguided for several reasons. For starters,
limitations on autonomous military technologies, although quite likely to find
wide superficial acceptance among some states and some non-governmental
groups and actors, will have little traction among those most likely to develop
and use them. Some states may want the United States to be more aggressive
in adopting the latest technologies, given that possible adversaries are likely to
have far fewer compunctions about their own autonomous weapon systems, and
others are likely to favor any technological development that extends the reach
and impact of U.S. and allied forces or enhances their own ability to counter
adversaries’ capabilities.
Even states and groups inclined to support treaty prohibitions or limitations
will find it difficult to reach agreement on scope or definitions because lethal
autonomy will be introduced incrementally—as battlefield machines become
smarter and faster, and the real-time human role in controlling them gradually
recedes, agreeing on what constitutes a prohibited autonomous weapon will be
unattainable. Even assuming agreement could be reached, there are the general
challenges of compliance: the collective action problems of failure and defection
that afflict all such treaty regimes, especially when dealing with dual-use
(civilian and military) underlying technologies.
Finally, there are serious humanitarian risks to prohibition, given the possibility
that autonomous weapons systems could in the long run be more discriminating
and ethically preferable to alternatives. If all such systems are prohibited, and
particularly if even research and development of relevant technologies is also
prohibited, one never gets the benefits that might come from new technologies—
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and future generations will not even be aware of the potential benefits that
were given up, because these prohibitions on development meant they were
never even pursued. Prohibition precludes the possibility of such benefits, and
proponents of it must acknowledge and bear responsibility for this risk.

Principles, Policies, and Processes for Regulating Automating
Weapon Systems
The risks and dangers associated with advancing autonomous robotic
weapons are very real. Of course the grave dangers include the possible
abuse of this technology by parties that do not respect existing international
legal requirements—especially those that flagrantly cast aside the principles
of distinction and proportionality. They also include less nefarious but
nevertheless significant risks, such as unintended and unpredicted interactions
between automated or autonomous systems; mistaken belief that a human
operator will be able to meaningfully remain “on the loop” in real-time (whereas
in practice the human operator may not have sufficient time or alternative
sources of information to make any meaningful counter-decision); or even a
decision algorithm for which the programmers did not sufficiently understand,
incorporate, or test the requirements of the law of armed conflict for a particular
situation that arises. The authors of the Defense Department directive on
autonomous weapons were well aware that whether a system is merely highly
automated or genuinely autonomous might well depend less on the machine’s
design than on the anticipated role for the human operators. If they cannot
reasonably perform that role (perhaps because it is effectively beyond human
capabilities or because those doing the operating have not been sufficiently
trained), a system believed to be merely automated to a limited point might turn
out to be effectively autonomous.
Given all of these risks, and to promote many other interests as well, the United
States has a serious interest in promoting legal and ethical norms to guide the
application of fundamental principles of the laws of war to the development and
evaluation of emerging automated and autonomous weapons, and in guiding
development in this context of international norms. By “international norms”
here, we do not mean new binding legal rules only—whether treaty rules or
customary international law—but instead the gradual fostering of widely-held
expectations about legally or ethically appropriate conduct, whether formally
binding or not. Among other reasons, such norms are important to the United
States for guiding and constraining its internal practices, such as research and
development (R&D) and eventual deployment of autonomous lethal systems that
it regards as legal; they help earn and sustain necessary buy-in from the officers
and lawyers who would actually use or authorize such systems in the field.48
They help establish common standards among the United States and its partners
and allies to promote cooperation and joint operations. And they raise the
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political and diplomatic costs to adversaries of developing, selling, or using
autonomous lethal systems that run afoul of these standards.
A better approach than treaties for addressing these systems is the gradual
development of internal state norms and best practices that, worked out,
debated, and applied to the United States’ own weapons-development process,
can be carried outwards to discussions with others around the world. Nationallevel processes should be combined with international dialogue aimed at
developing common standards and legal interpretations. This requires a longterm, sustained effort combining internal ethical and legal scrutiny and external
diplomacy and collaboration.
For its part, the government of the United States must resist two extreme
instincts—its own instincts among officials to hunker down behind secrecy and
avoid discussing and defending even guiding principles, on the one hand, and the
instincts of critics or skeptics of autonomous lethal systems favoring the idea of
some grand international treaty to regulate or even prohibit them, on the other.
Instead the U.S. government should carefully and continually develop internal
principles, processes, and practices that it believes are correct for the design
and implementation of such systems. It should also prepare to articulate clearly
to the world the fundamental legal and moral standards by which all parties
ought to judge autonomous weapons, whether those of the United States or those
of others.
The core, baseline standards can and should be drawn and adapted from the
customary law of armed conflict framework: the principles distinction and
proportionality. Even if we are a long way from having, or possibly ever wanting
to have for actual deployment, an autonomous weapon that would be able to
make the required judgments of distinction and proportionality as probabilistic
judgments, we should undertake the research into it, and ensure that those
doing the engineering and design research understand just how difficult the
concepts are for human beings. Proportionality, for example, is partly a technical
issue of designing systems capable of measuring predicted civilian harm,
but also partly an ethical issue of attaching weights to the variables at stake.
It also is important to bear in mind the point made earlier that distinction and
proportionality assessments are probabilistic, so those programming these
systems or those deciding how to set and use them must decide on minimum
confidence levels, which might depend on specific contexts and missions. Some
of the most important discussions among engineers, lawyers, commanders, and
policy-makers will therefore be about where to set those parameters and value
settings (forms of which are already done routinely in formulating military rules
of engagement and conducting collateral damage assessments for bombing or
targeting operations).49 These will be legally, ethically, and pragmatically difficult
discussions, and they should be.
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Such questions move from overarching legal, ethical, and policy principles to
processes that make sure principles are concretely taken into account—not
just down the road at the deployment stage but much earlier, during the R&D
stage. It will not work to go forward with design and only afterwards, seeing
the technology, decide what changes need to be made in order to make the
system’s decision-making conform to legal requirements. By then it may be too
late. Engineering designs will have been set for both hardware and software and
significant national investment into R&D already undertaken will be hard to write
off on ethical or legal grounds. Legal, ethical, and policy review by that stage
could become a matter of justification at the back end, rather than seeking best
practices at the front end. None of this urges a ban, as some call for, but it does
urge careful attention to normative as well as design concerns at each step along
the way.
The United States must develop a set of principles to regulate and govern
advanced autonomous weapons not just to guide its own systems, but also to
effectively assess the systems of other states. This requires that the United
States work to bring along its partners and allies—most notably NATO
members and technologically advanced Asian allies—by developing common
understandings of norms and best practices as the technology evolves. Just
as development of autonomous weapon systems will be incremental, so too will
development of norms about acceptable systems and uses.
Internal processes should therefore be combined with public articulation
of overarching policies. Various mechanisms for declaring policy might be
utilized over time—perhaps directives by the Secretary of Defense (like the
November 2012 directive already promulgated by the Deputy Secretary)—
followed by periodic statements explaining the legal rationale behind decisions
about R&D and deployment of weapon technologies. The United States has
taken a similar approach in the recent past to other controversial technologies,
most notably cluster munitions and landmines, by declaring commitment to
specific standards that balance operational necessities with humanitarian
imperatives.50 These policy pronouncements establish parameters internal to the
U.S. government and they serve as vehicles for explaining reasoning to outside
audiences at home and abroad; they can also be adapted by other states through
consultative processes.
Such a national-level process should be combined with international dialogues
aimed at fostering agreement on—or at least narrowing the differences with
respect to—efforts to adapt and translate the law of armed conflict to this
technological context. As a possible model, an international grouping of legal
experts commissioned by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence has been working for the past few years in another technologically
transformative area of conflict: cyber warfare. This process is meant to develop
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and propose interpretive guidance (including the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare51) for states’ and other actors’
consideration. Although the cyber context is different, insofar as there may be
greater disagreement as to the appropriate legal framework, similar international
processes—whether involving state representatives, or independent experts, or
both—can help foster broad consensus or surface disagreements that require
resolution with respect to autonomous weapon systems.
To be sure, this proposal risks papering over enormous practical and policy
difficulties. The natural instinct of the U.S. defense community—likewise
that of other major state powers—will be to discuss little or nothing, for fear
of revealing capabilities or programming details to adversaries, or enabling
industrial espionage and reverse-engineering of systems. Policy declarations
will necessarily be more general and less factually specific than critics
would like. Furthermore, one might reasonably question whether broad
principles like distinction and proportionality can meaningfully be applied and
discussed publicly with respect to high-tech systems distinguishable only in
terms of digital ones and zeroes buried deep in programmed computer code.
These concerns are real, and they demand two mitigating answers. First, the
United States will need to resist its own impulses toward secrecy and reticence
with respect to military technologies, recognizing that the interests those
tendencies serve are counterbalanced here by interests in shaping the normative
terrain on which it and others will operate militarily as technology quickly
evolves. The legitimacy of such inevitably controversial systems in the public
and international view matters greatly. It is better that the United States work to
set the global standard by actively explaining its compliance with it than to let it
be set by other states or groups—whether those who would impose ineffective
or counterproductive prohibitions or those who would prefer few or no
constraints at all.
Of course, there are limits to transparency here, on account of both secrecy
concerns and the practical limits of persuading skeptical audiences about the
internal and undisclosed decision-making capacities of rapidly evolving weapon
systems. A second part of the answer is therefore to emphasize the internal
processes by which the United States considers, develops, and tests its weapon
systems. Legal review of any new weapon system is required as a matter of
international law; as explained above, consistent with Article 36, the U.S. military
would conduct it in any event to ensure the basic lawfulness of new weapon
technologies. Even when the United States cannot disclose publicly the details
of its automated systems and their internal programming, however, it should be
as open as it can about its vetting procedures, both at the R&D stage and at the
deployment stage, including the standards and metrics it uses in its evaluations.
That is, the United States should take the lead in emphasizing publicly the legal
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principles it applies and the policies and processes it establishes to ensure
compliance, encouraging others to do likewise.
Although the United States cannot be very open publicly with the results of its
tests, for fear of disclosing details of its capabilities to adversaries, it should at
least be prepared to share them with its military allies as part of an effort to
establish common standards. It should take the lead in inviting both high-level
state-to-state discussions of these informal best practices, as well as discussions
among weapons designers, engineers, lawyers, and others.
NGOs have an important role to play here in promoting transparency and best
practices. They should press states to ensure that the standards and processes
of review take all relevant legal, ethical, strategic, and engineering factors into
account, and they should also press states to be open about the specific content
of those standards and processes, including how they conduct legal reviews in
fielding new weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s traditional
role in fostering dialogue about proper standards and processes is important in
this area, as it is in others.
Looking more speculatively ahead, the standards the United States applies
internally in developing its systems might eventually form the basis of export
control standards, in sharing technologies with allies and other states. As other
countries develop their own autonomous weapons systems, and refine their
policies and processes for regulating them, the United States can lead in forging
a common export control regime and standards of acceptable weapons available
on international markets.
In the end, one might still raise an objection from an entirely different direction
to these proposals: that the United States (or any rational state in a similar
position) should not unnecessarily constrain itself in advance under a set of
normative commitments, given vast uncertainties about future technology,
threats, and the broader security environment. Better, the argument might
go, that the United States cautiously wait and avoid binding itself to one or
another legal interpretation or policy commitment until it needs to do so. This
objection fails to appreciate, however, that although significant deployment
of highly autonomous systems may be far off, R&D decisions are already upon
us. Development of highly automated systems today is already intertwined
with development of future autonomous systems. Moreover, shaping
international norms is a long-term process, and unless the United States and
its allies accept some risk in starting it now, they may lose the opportunity to
do so later.
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Conclusion
The incremental development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems
is inevitable, and any attempt at a global ban will be ineffective in stopping their
use by the states whose acquisition of such weaponry would be most dangerous.
Autonomous weapon systems are not inherently unlawful or unethical. Existing
legal norms are sufficiently robust to enable us to address the new challenges
raised by robotic systems. The best way to adapt existing norms to deal with
these new technologies is a combined and international-national dialogue
designed to foster common standards and spread best practices.
Taken as a whole, these policy proposals reflect a rather traditional approach—
relying on the gradual evolution and adaptation of long-standing law of armed
conflict principles—to regulate what seems to many like a revolutionary
technological and ethical predicament. That is in part because the challenge of
regulating apparently radical innovations in weaponry within a long-standing
legal and ethical framework is hardly novel.
Some view the emergence of automated and autonomous weapon systems as
a crisis for the law and ethics of war. To the contrary, provided we start now
to incorporate legal and ethical norms adapted to weapons that incorporate
emerging technologies of automation, the incremental movement from
automation to machine autonomy can be both regulated and made to serve
the ends of law on the battlefield.
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